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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
ST ATE OF GEORGIA 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
ROBERT E. HARDY, II, WILLIAM E. 
PACKER, JR., and TRF 
PRODUCTIONS, LLC, 
Individual Defendants. 
and 
RAINFOREST 
HOLDINGS, INC. 
BERNARD H. BRONNER, derivatively ) 
on behalf of Rainforest Production ) 
Holdings, Inc. and directly on behalf of ) 
himself, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PRODUCTION 
Nominal Defendants 
Civil Action File No. 2014CV248023 
Bus. Case Div. 1 
ORDER ON CERTAIN PENDING MOTIONS 
This matter is before the Court on various pending pleadings: ( 1) Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment; (2) Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum of Law in Excess 
of Page Limit; (3) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony, For Sanctions and 
Attorney's Fees, and Motion to Extend Deadline for Dispositive Motions ("Motion to Compel"); 
(4) Counterclaimants' Motion for Summary Partial Judgment - Counterclaims; and (5) 
Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum oflaw 
in Excess of Page Limit and incorporated request to strike Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Memorandum of Law. Having considered the record, the Court finds as follows: 
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A. Defendants and Counterclaimants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
Although Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Counterclaimants' Motion for 
Summary Partial Judgment - Counterclaims are pending, the Court will address the parties' 
discovery dispute before considering those motions. See Parks v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 258 
Ga. App. 876, 877, 575 S.E.2d 673, 675 (2002) (quoting McCall v. Henry Med. Center, 250 Ga. 
App. 679, 685(2), 551 S.E.2d 739 (2001)) ("As a general rule, this Court does not condone the 
grant of summary judgment while a motion to compel discovery is pending, unless it can be 
determined that 'the disallowed discovery would add nothing of substance to the party's claim"'). 
B. Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Memorandum of Law in Excess of 
Page Limit 
In their motion, Defendants request leave of Court to file their 143-page memorandum in 
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. Prior to being transferred to the Business Court, 
the Hon. Judge Adams entered a case management order that did not include any limitation on 
the length of legal briefs. Upon being transferred, this Court's standard case management order 
(which imposes a 30-page limit on briefs without prior leave of Court) was not entered. Rather, 
the Court has entered various scheduling orders amending deadlines, but which did not address 
the length of briefs. 
Given the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion and will accept the briefing 
submitted to date. The Court, thus, DENIES Plaintiff's request that the Court strike Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and related memorandum. However, moving forward and absent 
prior permission from the Court, all briefs filed in support of or in response to a motion are 
limited in length to thirty pages at 12-point font. 
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C. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 
The powers of the trial court to control the time, place, scope and financing 
of discovery are construed broadly. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587, 
589, 452 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1994), disapproved of on other grounds by Chrysler Grp. LLC v. 
Walden, No. S17G0832, 2018 WL 1323992 (Ga. Mar. 15, 2018); Bicknell v. CBT Factors Corp., 
171 Ga. App. 897,899,321 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1984). 
With respect to the general scope of discovery, O.C.G.A. §9-l l-26(b )(1) provides: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and 
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the 
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence ... 
Relevancy is liberally construed: "[I]n the discovery context, courts should and ordinarily do 
interpret 'relevant' very broadly to mean any matter that is relevant to anything that is or may 
become an issue in litigation." Bowden v. Medical Center. Inc., 297 Ga. 285, 291 (2015) 
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
Here, Bernard H. Bronner ("Bronner") shareholder of Rainforest Production Holdings, 
Inc. ("Rainforest"), brought a direct and derivative action against William E. Packer ("Packer"), 
Robert E. Hardy ("Hardy"), TRF Productions (''TRF") and Rainforest ( collectively 
"Defendants"). Bronner alleges that Packer and Hardy abused their fiduciary duties as officers 
and board members of Rainforest by creating companies that directly competed with Rainforest. 
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In the instant Motion, Bronner seeks to compel Packer to appear to complete his 
deposition. Packer was noticed to sit for a deposition in his individual capacity and as the 
30(b )( 6) designee for four separate companies relevant to this action. On January 31, 2018, prior 
to the close of discovery, Plaintiff deposed Packer for just short of seven hours. At the 
conclusion of that day, Mr. Parker had to leave due to another obligation and Plaintiff "le[ft] 
open the deposition for that purpose" so that it could be continued on another date.1 Defendants' 
counsel responded that counsel would confer to "come to some agreement as to what there 
remains to be explored with Mr. Packer." However, the parties were not able to reach a 
resolution and Mr. Packer ultimately refused to sit for a second deposition. Plaintiff argues 
Packer's testimony-both in his individual capacity and as the 30(b)(6) representative of various 
entities-is relevant to Plaintiffs allegations that Packer and Hardy established, maintained, and 
grew certain companies by "diverting monies and business opportunities from Rainforest." 
Having considered the record and the parties' arguments, the Court finds Packer's 
testimony is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant, admissible evidence and a 
continued deposition is warranted. Although the Motion to Compel was filed after Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment was submitted, it relates to a discovery dispute that predates the 
dispositive motion and the close of discovery. See Govindasamy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 311 
Ga. App. 452, 454, 715 S.E.2d 737, 740 (2011) ("If a respondent requires further discovery to 
properly respond to a motion, possible responses may include filing a motion to extend time to 
respond to the motion, a motion to compel, if the responses are overdue, or an affidavit pursuant 
to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(£) setting forth why the respondent is unable to proceed without further 
discovery") (citation omitted). Notably, the exhibits attached to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
2 
Motion to Compel, Exhibit A-Wi!Jiam E. Packer, Jr. Oepo., p. 3. 
Id. 
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indicate it was not until Feb. 22, 2018 (one day after Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
was filed) that Mr. Parker affirmatively stated, through counsel, that he would not agree to sit for 
a second deposition because he had already been deposed for seven hours. Less than a week 
thereafter Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Compel. 
Further, although under our Uniform Superior Court Rules a deposition is generally 
limited to one day of seven hours, the Rules also provide "[t]he court must allow additional time 
if needed for a fair examination of the deponent or if the deponent or another person or other 
circumstance impedes or delays the examination." Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 5.3. Insofar as 
Mr. Packer is being deposed in his individual capacity and as the 30(b)(6) designee for four 
separate companies relevant to the parties' dispute, the Court finds additional time is needed for 
a fair examination of Mr. Packer. 3 
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED, IN PART. Mr. Packer is instructed to 
appear for a continued deposition within thirty days of the entry of this Order. Counsel are asked 
to confer and agree on a time and place for the continued deposition which shall be limited to 
one day of seven hours. 
With respect to Plaintiff's request to extend the deadline for filing dispositive motions, 
the request is GRANTED, IN PART. Within sixty days of the entry of this Order, Defendants 
may supplement their pending dispositive motions as they deem appropriate but any such 
supplement(s) shall be limited to addressing any relevant testimony provided by Mr. Packer 
during his continued deposition. Any response(s) to the summary judgment motions, as 
supplemented, shall be submitted within thirty days of the supplement or, if no supplement is 
filed, 
3 See D. Tennell Lockett Aff., ,rn 19-22. 
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within ninety days of this Order. Finally, within sixty days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff 
may file a dispositive motion and Defendants shall submit any response within thirty days of the 
filing of that motion. 
SO ORDERED, this 6th day of April, 2018. 
~I<.~~ 
JUDGE MELVIN K. WESTMORELAND 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
Served upon registered service contacts through eFiJeGA: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ·- Attorneys for Defendants -- - 
D. Tennell Lockett T. Orlando Pearson 
Travis T. Townsend, Jr. Regina S. Molden 
Steven Pritchett THE MOLDEN LAW FIRM, LLC 
TOWNSEND & LOCKETT, LLC Peachtree Center - Harris Tower 
1401 Peachtree Street, Suite 500 233 Peachtree Street, N.E. 
Atlanta, GA 30309 Suite 1245 
Telephone: ( 404) 870-8501 Atlanta, GA 30303 
Facsimile: ( 404) 870-8502 Direct Dial: (404) 835-1712 
Tennell.lockett@townsendlockett.com Main: (404) 324-4500 
Travis. townsend@townsendlockett.com Fax: (404) 324-4501 
steven.gritchett@townsendlockett.com rmolden@moldenlaw.com 
togearson@mo ldenla w. com 
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